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CONTRACTS AND SALES 
] oseph Curtis• 
A wide variety of novel questions was presented to the Virginia courts, 
federal and state, during the period encompassed by this survey. Samplings 
of the unique situations before the courts include a written lease read by 
neither of the parties executing it, the droppings of pigeons on cars in a 
parking lot beneath a viaduct, and the dividing of a boat, motor and trailer 
among three adverse claimants. The following discussion concerns the ways 
in which the courts handled the interesting problems developed by these 
intriguing situations. 
CoNTRAcr DECISIONS 
A. Precatory Language 
In Crowder v. Commonwealth/ communications to an optionor stating 
" 'it is our desire to take up this option ... .' " and " 'please be advised 
that the State wishes to exercise its option and purchase the acreage of 
land ... .' " 2 were held not to be mere expressions of an intent to exercise 
the option at some future time. Other accompanying words and cir-
cumstances sufficiently manifested a present exercise-particularly the op-
tionor's treatment of the communications as an exercise in his subsequent 
actions. The Court also decided that tender of the purchase price was 
not essential to an effective exercise when the option itself provided for 
payment "when [the] deed is recorded." 
B. Insurance Proceeds 
It is the generally accepted rule that mere intent of the owner of a life 
39. United States v. Village Corp., 298 F.2d 816, 819 (4th Cir. 1962). 
40. H. Doc. No. 5, General Assembly of Va., 1956 Sess. 94. H the construction of 
the statutes is doubtful, resort to the Code Commission's Report is expressly authorized 
as an aid in interpreting the corporation code. VA. ConE ANN. § 13.1-132 (Repl. Vol. 
1956). 
•Professor of Law, William and Mary. B.S., 1934, LL.B., 1937, LL.M., 1948, New 
York University. Member, New York and Virginia Bars. 
I. 202 Va. 871, 121 S.E.2d 487 (1961). 
2. Id. at 872, 873, 121 S.E.2d at 487,488. 
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insurance policy is insufficient to change the beneficiary without some 
overt attempt to comply with policy provisions setting forth the manner 
in which the change may be effected.a This rule .stems from the once 
universal view that the interest of the beneficiary is vested subject 
to divestment, and that the divestment may occur only ,upon the event 
and in the manner prescribed therefor. Many jurisdictions, including 
Virginia, have strayed considerably from the vested view when the owner 
has reserved the right to change the beneficiary.4 But even these "expec-
tancy" states have retained that portion of the concept which requires 
the insured to do all that he reasonably can under the circumstances to 
comply with the procedures set forth in the policy for effecting the 
change. An interesting situation involving this issue was presented to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals in Carter v. Carter.5 
Decedent's \vife had been the original designated beneficiary of a group 
insurance policy purchased by decedent's employer as part of the company's 
employee insurance plan. A blanket accident policy providing additional 
coverage was subsequently acquired by the company as a complement 
to its other group insurance for employees. Decedent later changed the 
beneficiary of the group policy, as he had the right to do under its terms, 
designating his mother beneficiary of 2,000 dollars with his children to 
receive the balance of the proceeds. When the blanket policy reached 
a coverage of 40,000 dollars at decedent's then salary bracket, he was 
advised by the employer that death proceeds would be payable to the 
beneficiary designated in the group policy, and if none were so designated, 
then to the employee's estate. Four years later, at the time of decedent's 
death, the blanket policy coverage for decedent had increased to 126,000 
dollars, due to his rise in salary scale over the years. 
Decedent's wife maintained that in view of the mutual love, respect 
and cooperation between them, decedent could not have intended that 
she be excluded from the incre~ed policy benefits and that therefore the 
designation of beneficiaries should be reformed. The trial court, accepting 
this argument, decreed that only 40,000 dollars of the blanket proceeds 
should be paid in the manner provided by the group policy beneficiary 
designation and that the balance of 86,000 dollars, attributable-probably 
without his knowledge-to decedent's rise in salary scale, should be paid 
to his estate. 
Finding no precedent for the precise question presented by these facts, 
the Supreme Court of Appeals relied on the somewhat analogou!Y testamen-
tary bequests where bequeathed property has substantially increased in 
3. Compare Mitchell v. United States, 165 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1948), with Bradley 
v. United States, 143 F.2d 573 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 797 (1944). 
4. On the historical background of the "vested" theory, see Vance, The Beneficiary's 
Interest in a Life l'TlSUTance Policy, 31 YALE L.J. 343 (1922). 
5. 202 Va. 892, 121 S.E.2d 482 (1961). 
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value between the time of execution of the will and testator's death. It could 
find no more excuse for reforming the beneficiary designation in this 
case than for reforming the bequests and devises in the cases of testamen-
tary dispositions, and accordingly reversed the trial court, entering a 
final decree that the entire blanket policy proceeds pass to the beneficiaries 
designated in the grcmp policy. 
C. Existence Distinguished from Operation, Use and Maintenance 
It is somewhat fantastic to conceive of the Seaboard Air Line Railroad 
and the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority in legal battle before 
the Supreme Court of Appeals over the droppings of pigeons.6 
The Authority assumed liability for any damage due to, arising out of, 
or happening in connection with the operation, use and maintenance of 
the bridge facilities which it had constructed by right of easement over 
Seaboard's property. Seaboard leased the land beneath the viaduct to a 
lessee for parking lot purposes. The bridge proved to be an attractive 
nesting place for pigeons and consequently the lot below an unattractive 
place for parking automobiles. Seaboard sought to compel the Turnpike 
Authority to abate the nuisance, conceding, at least in its brief, that since 
the pigeons were ferae naturae, the Authority's liability must be founded 
upon the indemnity undertaking in the easement agreement. The Court 
agreed but could not find an assumption of liability in the wording of 
the provision and refused to interpret liability from the context. The 
damage caused by the pigeons, stated the Court, was a happening in 
connection with the existence of the bridge, not with its operation, use 
and maintenance. 
A fascinating facet of the operation of law is the applicability of its 
sometimes ponderous and deeply reasoned concepts, frequently centuries 
in formulation, to the seemingly trivial and most unawesome of incidents. 
Thus the rules as to construction of contracts and the liability of persons 
for the trespasses of animals which are ferae naturae are brought to bear 
upon this justiciable controversy, and the pigeons and parties resume their 
peaceful coexistence, at least as peacefully as the former will allow. 
D. Promise Never Made 
A court of equity may reform a contract ·to conform with the true 
undertakings of the parties. That it may do so even to the extent of 
wholly disregarding a provision in a written agreement was asserted by 
the District Court for the Western District of Virginia in Carriers Ins. 
Exch. v. Truck Ins. Exch.,7 where the parties had neither read the provision 
6. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority, 202 Va. 
1029, 121 S.E.2d 499 (1961). 
7. 203 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Va. 1962). 
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nor given any consideration whatsoever to the subject matter to which it 
related. 
Lessor, in the business of transporting petroleum products in tank 
trailers, was not licensed for interstate transportation. When interstate 
shipment was to be accomplished, it would oraiiy lease. its tank trailer 
to lessee, who was duly licensed and who would complete the~delivery, 
retaining ten per cent of the revenue and remitting ninety per cent to 
lessor. When advised by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the 
oral lease arrangement would no longer be acceptable, the parties resorted 
to form leases solely to satisfy the Commission. The form used on the 
occasion of an explosion caused by the negligence of the driver, and 
resulting in injuries and damages, recited that lessee was to provide public 
liability insurance. The evidence amply supported a finding that neither 
of the parties had read the written form and that the only provision dis-
cussed or considered by them concerned the division of the revenue. The 
court held that both were engaged in a joint venture, combining resources 
and services, and that the liability should be shared equaiiy by their 
respective insurance carriers. 
E. Miscellaneous Cases 
A party to a contract may not sue for nonperformance when he himself 
has been the cause of the other party's failure to perform. Moreover, his 
interference is a breach of promise giving a cause of action to the 
nonperforming party. However, the nonperforming party's damages are 
recoverable " 'only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient 
basis for estimating their amount in money with reasonable certainty.' " 8 
Thus, in Boggs v. Duncan,9 it was held that the mere opinion of the de-
fendant and another witness that the defendant might have made 6,000 
dollars was insufficient evidence upon which to calculate damages. 
A deed, conforming in terms with the oral offer and acceptance, given 
to a third party for the sole purpose of transmittal to the grantee is effec-
tively delivered. In Flippo v. Broome10 the third party retained the deed 
when threatened with suit by another claiming a superior right to purchase 
the property. The Court awarded specific performance to the grantee. 
Quaere, however, was the third party the grantor's agent for the purpose 
of consummating the sale, or should it not matter since the grantor 
parted with possession of the deed intending that it should take effect? 
The use of federal and state funds for the construction of a· community 
hospital does not per se transform the hospital into a public corporation. 
The Board of Trustees, vested with management of the hospital by i~ 
8. Boggs v. Duncan, 202 Va. 877, 883, 121 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1961). 
9. 202 Va. 877, 121 S.E.2d 359 (1961). 
10. 202 Va. 919, 121 S.E.2d 490 (1961). 
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charter and bylaws, may in its discretion deny use of the hospital to 
anyone applying for appointment to its medical staff. In Khoury v. 
Conmmnity Memorial Hasp., lnc.11 the Court, upholding the absolute 
discretion of the Board, indicated that the hospital was a private corporation 
and that the applicant had no right to a hearing before the board. 
The ejusdem generis rule is invoked only for the purpose of ascertaining 
the intent and mearung of the language under consideration and should 
not be applied so as to do violence to it. Thus, in W. F. Magann Corp. 
v. Virginia-Carolina Elec. W arks, lnc.12 it was held that a contract stipulat-
ing that the defendant agreed to protect the general contractor from all 
liability for damage caused by defendant, "its agents, employees, subcontrac-
tors, vendors, materialmen, or 'any other person having anything whatso-
ever to do in connection with the work,' " 13 was not limited to agents and 
employees, etc., but would be construed to include injury caused by 
another subcontractor whose work was with the knowledge of and in 
conjunction with the work of defendant. 
A broker is not entitled to a commission for finding a "ready, able, 
and willing purchaser" when the purchaser attaches a condition to his 
acceptance which conflicts with the specific instructions given to the 
broker by the seller. In Tooles v. Brunk,14 the broker claimed that the 
seller had accepted a subsequent verbal offer communicated to him by 
the broker purporting to be by the same buyer. Upon finding that 
such offer was not in fact authorized by the buyer, the Court held that 
the seller was not bound to pay the commission. 
In Arlington Towers Land Corp. v. McFarland15 the Court added still 
another precedent supporting the proposition that a novation is never 
to be presumed. An agreement whereby an employee-stockholder, as 
one of a group, sold all of the stock of the employer corporation to a 
third party was held not to be a substitute for the employment contract 
previously entered into between the employee and the corporation in 
the absence of clear and convincing evidence that it was intended to 
do so. 
Facts and circumstances may establish the agency of a husband for 
his wife, notwithstanding the absence of a presumption solely by reason 
of the marital relationship. In Littreal v. Howell16 negotiations for the 
work in question 'vere conducted in the wife's presence and on her 
premises and the work was performed pursuant to her instructions. 
The agency relationship of the broker and the seller generally terminates 
11. 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E.2d 533 (1962). 
12. 203 Va. 259, 123 S.E.2d 377 (1962). 
13. Jd. at 263, 123 S.E.2d at 380. 
14. 203 Va. 289, 124 S.E.2d 32 (1962). 
15. 203 Va. 387, 124 S.E.2d 212 (1962). 
16. 203 Va. 394, 124 S.E.2d 16 (1962). 
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upon execution of the contract of sale by the buyer and seller. The 
broker is thereafter free to act for the buyer in attempting to find a 
purchaser for him. Furthermore, the Court held in Ojson v. Brickles11 that 
the broker does not breach his obligation to the seller by making suggestions 
which are more favorable to the purchaser when they are qpenly discussed 
and agreed to by both parties and the seller voluntarily agrees to pay the 
broker his commission after the signing of the purchase agreement. 
SALES DECISIONS 
A. Privity Requirement in Breach of Contract Actions 
1. Foodstuffs 
In 1959 the Supreme Court of Appeals held in Swift & Co. v. Wells18 
that the privity of contract ordinarily required for breach of contract 
actions was not essential to the · maintenance of an action for breach 
of the implied warranty that food is fit for human consumption. The 
Court, following the lead of many other states, allowed a consumer who 
had purchased a ham from a local retailer to recover on implied warranty 
from the processor for food poisoning. In Harris v. Hampton Roads 
Tractor & Equip. Co.,t9 the line was drawn at the sale of foodstuffs, and 
the Court affirmed the application of the general rule requiring privity 
to the sale of machinery. The operator of a crane, an employee of the 
purchaser, was denied recovery for injuries sustained from alleged defective 
installation 'vithout a sho,ving of negligence on the part of the defendant 
dealer. Swift, therefore, sets forth an exception applicable to foodstuffs 
rather than an abrogation of the general rule.20 
2. Inherently Dangerous Products 
In General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos21 there is dictum by the Court 
that the exception to the privity requirement would extend to include 
sales of inherently dangerous products. However, the product in that 
case was sliding doors and tlle negligence complained of was a defective 
17. 203 Va. 447, 124 S.E.2d 895 (1962). 
18. 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). For an extended discussion of this case 
see Dillard, Contracts & Sales, 1959-1960 Arm. Survey of Va. Law, 46 VA. L. REv. 
1626·(1960). 
19. 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471 (1961). 
20. For 1962 legislation affecting this issue see VA. ConE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 
1962). This statute is discussed in the text accompanying note 35 infra. 
21. 203 Va. 66, 70, 122 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1962). See Emroch, Statutory Elimination 
of Privity Requirement in Products Liability Cases, 48 VA. L. REv. 982 (1962), for 
an e."l:tended discussion of the Bronze case. See generally Annot., 74 AL.R.2d 1111, 
1141 (1960). 
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design which permitted rain water to leak into the premises. Distinguishing 
the danger of injury which stems from the product itself from the danger 
which results from a defect in the making of the product, the Court 
found such doors not to be an inherently dangerous product. As in Harris, 
the absence of privity of contract between the manufacturer and the 
owner of the premises precluded an implied warranty; and the Court 
held, reversing the trial court judgment, that the evidence was insufficient 
to present a jury question on express warranty. 
B. Qualification on Rigbt of Retum Distinguished from Guarantee 
Generally in a sale on approval the buyer need not specify his reasons 
for timely rejection and return of the goods.22 The parties may, of 
course, limit the buyer's right in this respect by setting forth qualifying 
conditions in the ag~eement. In Pettibone Wood Mfg. Co. v. Pio11eer 
Comtr. Co.23 the distinction between a general sale on approval and one 
'vith only a conditional right of return permitted construction of a term 
as merely a guide for the testing of a machine during the trial period 
instead of a guarantee extending over the period of use of the machine. 
In addition to other affirmations relating to its efficiency, the agreement 
set forth that the overall cost of operating a road materials pulverizing 
machine would not exceed twenty-five cents a ton. The trial period 
was not to exceed five working days. Following one year's use of the 
machine and the crushing of 100,000 tons of materials, as it was guaranteed 
to do, the buyer commenced action against the seller for breach of 
contract, alleging damages for the difference between the twenty-five 
cents cost asserted in the agreement and the ninety-sL'\: cents which buyer 
claimed was the actual operation cost. The Court did not agree with buyer 
that twenty-five cents was a guarantee extending over the entire period 
of crushing 100,000 tons. It found it to be a reasonable construction 
(and one more in accord with the rule that an interpretation should be 
avoided which would place one party at the mercy of another) that 
twenty-five cents was intended as a basis to determine if, at the expiration 
of the trial period, the buyer would be justified in exercising its option to 
return the machine. 
C. Merchantability Implied but Unnierchantability Not Proved 
The implied warranty of merchantability, that goods are reasonably 
fit for the purposes for which goods of that description are generally used, 
is seeking its level in Virginia law. Categorically accepted only recently 
in Smith v. Hensley ,24 one more securing nail was administered by the 
22. 46 A:r.1. ]uR. Sales§ 500 (1943). 
23. 203 Va. 152, 122 S.E.2d 885 (1961). 
24. 202 Va. 700, 119 S.E.2d 332 (1961). 
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Fourth Circuit in Moore v. Hecht Co.,25 a case involving the sale of 
bedroom slippers. However, ·the existence of the warranty, coupled with 
injury to the buyer while using the goods, did not complete the plain-
tiff's case. Plaintiff's burden included proving that the goods were defective 
and that the defect caused her injuries. The court agreed with the trial 
court that plaintiff's loss of balance and fall on a hardwood floor while 
wearing the newly purchased slippers was not sufficient proof of a lack 
of firmness of tread or dangerous slickness in the soles of the slippers. 
D. Titillating Title Case 
Resting as it does on case law, our common law system may sometimes 
carry us back a good number of centuries in the search for precedent. 
The Biblical adage that a man may not serve two masters was considered 
and distinguished in Carriers Ins. Exch. v. Truck Ins. Exch.26 But the 
new record for the earliest precedent may have been set by Judge Thomas 
A. Michie, of the District Court for the Western District of Virginia, in 
deciding In re Lawson.21 
Owner, prior to his bankruptcy, gave possession of a boat, motor and 
trailer to one of his creditors. Although it was disputed whether he loaned 
them or sold them in consideration of a credit against the indebtedness, the 
court held the latter more likely under the circumstances, despite the 
complete lack of any written evidence of a sale. Subsequently, owner 
purported to sell a one-half interest in the same properties to a third 
party, this time reversing the procedure by providing much written 
evidence, a conditional sales agreement and the certificate of title for the 
traile.r, but failing to deliver possession of the properties. Following 
owner's bankruptcy, the first and second purchasers and the trustee in 
bankruptcy each claimed superior right to the properties. Holding that 
actual transfer of possession of personalty is sufficient to transfer title 
when coupled with the intent to do so, Judge Michie awarded the boat 
and motor to the first purchaser. However, with regard to motor vehicles, 
which category includes trailers,28 transfer of the certificate of title is 
essential to pass property interest in Virginia. Accordingly, the one-half 
interest evidenced by the certificate of title to the trailer, held by second 
purchaser, was accorded validity, while the other one-half interest in 
the trailer p~ssed to the trustee. 
Judge Michie's appropriate finding of some analogy in Solomon's judg-
ment regarding the baby claimed by two women probably establishes 
the time period record, if not for authority, at least for analogy. 
25. 298 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1962). 
26. 203 F. Supp. 764 (W.D. Va.1962). 
27. 201 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Va. 1962). 
28. See VA. CooE ANN.§ 46.1-41 (Rep!. Vol. 1958). 
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LEGISLATION 
Two recent legislative enactments in this field of law, one affecting 
contracts and the other the law of sales, are of sufficient general interest 
to warrant more than mere passing notice. 
Section 11-20 of the Virginia code29 requires that in addition to the 
general contractor of a public contract each subcontractor of work in 
excess of 2,500 dollars shall furnish a payment bond with security thereon 
conditioned upon payment to labormen and materialmen engaged in the 
prosecution of the work provided for in the subcontract. The responsibility 
to see that such bond is furnished by the subcontractor is imposed upon 
the contractor. In the 1962 regular session, the General Assembly gave 
the subcontractor's labormen and materialmen a direct right of action 
against the obligors and sureties on the bond required of the contractor 
in the event that the latter failed to require the subcontractor's bond.30 
The enactment having the broadest impact, however, was the one 
affecting sales.31 Swift & Co. v. Wells,a2 referred to in the discussion of 
the Harris case,33 made an exception to the privity requirement in the 
sales of foodstuffs. As noted previously, the Court in Ge11eral Bro11ze 
Corp. v. Kostopulos,34 indicated its complete 'villingness to extend the 
exception to include sales of inherently dangerous products. But the 
sense of all three of these cases, especially Harris, leaves no doubt that 
at least so far as Virginia case law was concerned the general rule requiring 
privity is to be observed and adhered to in all sales cases other than 
foodstuffs and inherently dangerous products. However, section 8-654.3,31'i 
enacted in the 1962 regular session, eliminates the privity requirement and 
bars any defense thereof in actions grounded on breach of warranty or 
negligence against a manufacturer or seller of goods by one who might 
reasonably have been expected to use, consume, or be affected by the 
goods. Henceforth, in actions based on breach of warranty, e:ll.-press or 
implied, the requirement of privity will be the exception and not the 
general rule. 
There seems little doubt to the writer that by including the seller as 
well the manufacturer among those to whom the defense is barred, the 
legislature intended to do away with the previously existing distinction 
29. VA. ConE ANN.§ 11-20 (Supp. 1962). 
30. Ibid. 
31. VA. ConE ANN.§ 8-654.3 (Supp. 1962). 
32. 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). 
33. Harris v. Hampton Roads Tractor & Equip. Co., 202 Va. 958, 121 S.E.2d 471 
(1961). 
34. 203 Va. 66, 122 S.E.2d 548 (1961). 
35. VA. ConE ANN. § 8-654.3 (Supp. 1962). For further treatment of this enactment 
and a discussion of products liability in Virginia, see generally Emroch, supra note 21. 
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in Virginia law between vertical and horizontal privity. In Swift & Co. v. 
W ells36 a break in privity occurred in the sales chain, but the retailer's 
purchaser, through an agent, was permitted recovery against the manu-
facturer. However, in Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co.31 the consumer, 
a nonpurchaser, was not permitted to recover against .the seller, the 
break occurring beyond the sales chain. Rosedale Dairy is commented 
upon by the Court in the Swift case with seeming approval.38 It would 
now appear from the wording of the statute that the nonpurchasing con-
sumer may recover not only from the seller, providing he is one who might 
reasonably have been expected to consume, but also, in the alternative, 
from the manufacturer despite the double break in the privity chain. 
Some interesting ~actual questions as to who might reasonably be expected 
to use, consume, or be affected by the goods are foreshadowed. 
36. 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959). 
37. 166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936). 
38. Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 218, 110 S.E.2d 203, 206 (1959). 
